Congressional Dysfunction - Part 1: Congress Today

In a recent post, Ezra Klein profiled 14 reasons why the current Congress is the worst Congress ever. I find little to argue with in Klein's myriad criticisms of Congress, other than to suggest that the present dysfunction has been a long time coming and is the result of many moving parts slowing coming into sync. In the next few months, a book that I co-authored with Steven Schier - The Dysfunction of American Politics - will begin to hit book shelves. In advance of that publication I have decided to excerpt my chapter on Congress over the course of the next week or so. What I hope to create is a more complete picture of Congressional dysfunction. Perhaps of greater importance, the picture I'll present portrays a dysfunction that is deeply bipartisan. Contrary to the recent claims by noted Congressional scholars Thomas Mann and Norm Ornstein the dysfunction is not simply the fault of an insurgent and radicalized GOP. The problem goes much deeper than that and as a result will be much more difficult to repair.

Part 1: Congress Today

Writing in 2006 in their aptly titled "The Broken Branch" Congressional scholars Thomas Mann and Norm Ornstein described the contemporary Congress as “a supine, reactive body more eager to submit to presidential directives than to assert its own prerogatives." According to the authors, many characteristics that define the contemporary Congress took shape during the period of the late 1960s. Among the changes was a shift away from the “textbook” Congress of the New Deal era characterized by a decentralized power structure, powerful committee chairs, and weak parties.

Though I agree with much of what Mann and Ornstein presented in The Broken Branch, I believe the seeds of Congressional dysfunction where planted a bit earlier. A combination of internal and external pressures dating to the late 1950s set in motion the creation of the contemporary Congress. A series of elections spanning nearly two decades (from the the 1950s-1970s) changed the ideological make-up of the Democratic party. A combination of court decisions and federal legislation (in the 1960s) changed the nature of congressional constituencies. A series of internal reforms enacted from the late 1960s through the mid-1970s empowered individual members of Congress. Concomitant with these changes was a dramatic rise in interest groups, a marked rise in two-party competition, and the frequent presence of divided partisan control of the legislative and executive branches. Collectively, these changes raised the stakes in the pitched battle over lawmaking.  Highly professionalized members, intense partisan polarization, centralized control among party leaders, and an increased reliance on “unorthodox” procedures to secure passage of legislation mark the Congress that emerged.

Over the course of the next few weeks, I will discuss in detail what I merely summarize now.

Two deeply polarized political parties engaged in a close-fought and bitter struggle for electoral victory and legislative control mark the contemporary Congress. Though the even level of electoral competition has been especially evident in recent years, it first emerged in the late 1970s when Republicans gained a congressional foothold in the south. Increased electoral competition coupled with the advent of divided government gave rise to reforms in the Congress that first empowered individual members to become highly professional representatives but then gave way into further changes that effectively centralized control around the organizing principle of party. In the House and Senate, members realized that the best way to ensure success of the party agenda and to obstruct the minority party was through greater centralization of power in party leadership. This was more readily achieved in the House, but even in the Senate changes in the minority/majority approach to floor activity and amendments show that centralization around party – if not necessarily party leadership – has occurred.

In today’s Congress, lawmakers pursue initiatives important to their constituents, to key interest groups, and to their party in a professional environment of ideologically uniform parties with sharp agenda differences. Washington’s professional and partisan legislature often supports a president in the same party as a congressional majority and obstructs an opposition party president. As measured by the number of pages in the Federal Register, the contemporary Congress appears capable of legislating, though not when addressing issues of major concern.  Why?  The congressional parties diverge sharply on major issues, leading to attempts at legislative domination by partisan majorities and obstruction by partisan minorities.

There are now so many voices at play in policy-making, described fully in chapters two and six, that it has become more difficult to legislate and easier to obstruct. Multiple congressional committees and subcommittees enjoy some degree of jurisdiction over major issues. These committees in turn have established mutually beneficial relationships with interest groups. Multiple committee referrals are quite common as a result. Party leadership uses restrictive rules and post-committee adjustment to ensure buy-in by the multitude of interested voices. Such buy-in requires difficult and finely crafted compromises. In a closely divided and polarized environment, every incentive exists for a minority party to derail or prevent such compromises. The result is often congressional inaction and policy stasis.

The great challenges of the present era will often require congressional action. By acting, Congress frequently defines the scope and powers of the executive bureaucracy – Washington’s “permanent government” -- and the scope and jurisdiction of the judiciary. Since the 1960s and 1970s, Congress has become increasingly divided by party and unable to perform its duties with decorum and dispatch.  Dysfunction within Congress reverberates throughout the entirety of the American political system.

Next - Part 2: The Rise of Progresive Democrats - 1958-1974

America is not Polarized, but the Parties Are, part 15...

Now that the battle over the Debt Ceiling is settled (at least until Congress comes back from recess) we are once again treated to the usual chorus of voices bemoaning how polarized America has become. As such, I feel compelled to once again dispell the myth that America is a polarized nation.

As I argued during the healthcare battle, after the Gabbie Giffords shooting, and prior to the 2010 midterms, Americans are not polarized (at least no more polarized than at any point in the last 40 years), but our two political parties are very polarized - dominated by ideological and issue activists who do not represent the beliefs of the larger electorate.

Since the 1960s and the end of the Democratic Party’s dominance of the New Deal Era, American politics has become far more competitive. Democrats lost their solid hold on the South and Republicans lost their hold on the North East. Only 7 states had divided government in 1954, in 2007 that number stood at 23 states. With few exceptions, either party has fair shot at winning statewide elections in most states. Control of Congress and the White House has bounced back and forth between the two parties. The parties have responded to this era of competition by becoming ever more partisan and polarized.

A recent study by political scientist Daniel Coffey determined that there is a direct and positive correlation between party competition and party ideology. As a state becomes more competitive between Republicans and Democrats the respective parties become ever more conservative and liberal. V.O. Key hinted at this in 1956 when he argued that competition would force parties to offer more distinct policies to voters in an effort to influence their choice. Additionally, as competition increases the parties come to rely more heavily, not on the mean, median, or moderate voter, but rather on the more committed and activist voter. This means liberal activists for Democrats and conservative activists for Republicans. This has the effect of pushing the parties ever farther to the extreme.

As the agendas of the two political parties became ever more divergent after the 1960s Americans began to "sort" more neatly into one party or the other, a phenomenon known as party sorting. As the Democratic Party became more liberal and the Republican Party more conservative, liberal Republicans left the party and became Democrats or Independents and conservative Democrats became Republicans or Independents. The parties polarized, the public did not.

In fact, there has been precious little change in the last 30 years with regard to the share of Americans who identify as Conservative, Moderate, or Liberal. Rather conservatives no longer feel comfortable in the Democratic Party and Liberals are no longer comfortable in the Republican Party - Moderates appear to be less comfortable with both parties and that explains why Independent voters have emerged as the fastest growing segment of the American electorate. As a result of this sorting, the Republican Party became more homogenously Conservative and the Democratic Party more homogenously Liberal. So the distribution of Liberals, Conservatives, and Moderates within the the two parties has changed significantly while the distribution of Liberals, Conservatives, and Moderates within  broader electorate has changed very little.

The electorate is no more polarized now than in 1970, 1980, or 1990 - but the parties are. So of course 90 percent of Republicans vote Republican and 90 percent of Democrats vote Democrat and Presidential approval correlates to party affiliation, and Democratic members of Congress have become more Liberal and Republican members of Congress more conservative. Meanwhile, Moderate voters tend to split their support between the parties, but also vote at lower levels - likely a result of feeling ill-represented by either party. All of this is a natural byproduct of party sorting, but party sorting is not the same as polarization.

Though some scholars (especially, but not limited to, Alan Abramowitz) have advanced the theory that this growing polarization among elected officials is in fact reflective of a polarized public, there is in fact little evidence that the mass public has become polarized. Rather the polarization has occurred among committed political activists and the interest groups they support – a relatively small share of the electorate.

This is evident in Figure One, panel A shows the self-identified ideological orientation of the general electorate at three points 1972, 1994, and 2008. Although the distribution has shifted over time, the distribution remains normal with most voters amassed in the center as Moderates. Panel B is limited to those members of the electorate who indicated that they had worked for a campaign and given money to a candidate – I define these voters as party activists. Among these activists, a clear bimodal distribution is evident with the peaks of the distribution to the left and the right of moderation.

According to political scientist Anthony Downs in a winner-take-all election system coupled with two dominant parties (as in the United States) the parties will adopt positions that are ideologically attractive to the greatest concentration of voters.

The distribution of the American electorate (in the broadest sense) is unimodal which, according to Downs, should promote more moderate parties as they compete for the median voter. But Downs’ theory further suggests that if the electorate was polarized into two distinct voting blocs, one left of center and one right of center, the parties would “diverge toward the extremes rather than converge on the center. Each gains more votes by moving toward a radical position than it loses in the center (p. 143).” Steven Hill writes "one of the defining characteristics of a winner-take-all system is that it promotes adversarial politics so that on a whole host of issues it is painfully obvious that the overriding agenda for both major parties is... to stake out positions vis-a-vis the other side."

In the 1960s Republicans exploited several emerging schisms in the ranks of the Democratic Party's coalition in order to become competitive - schisms revolving around national security, welfare spending, and policies with regard to race relations. The party defined itself by being what the Democratic Party was not. Over time both parties increasingly defined themselves by being the antithesis of the other party - this is why there can be no middle ground on isues ranging from abortion, entitlement spending, taxes, environmental regulation, healthcare reform - each party's identity is inextricably linked to being the mirror image of the other party.

This led to party sorting, internal partisan homogeneity, and the bimodal distribution of the engaged voters evident in Figure One. The distribution of the most engaged and activist elements of the electorate, those most likely to participate and vote in elections, is bimodal which has resulted in two polarized parties and the system now feeds off of that bimodal distribution. So long as the more Moderate members of the general electorate remain less engaged there is little incentive for either party to moderate and pursue Moderate voters; rather to do so would risk alienating more committed activist party members. So long as neither party moderates and pursues more Moderate members of the electorate there is little incentive for Moderate voters to become more engaged – a self-reinforcing cycle exists.

The increased electoral competition between the Democratic and Republican parties, in the current era, has had a significant impact on public opinion, partisanship, polarization, and the institutions of governance. As described by Congressional scholar Norm Orstein the present era is “an extended era of close partisan margins, which gave rise to high-stakes legislative politics and sharply reduced incentives for lawmakers to work across party lines to solve problems.”

The only hope for restoring moderation, compromise, and good government - for breaking the hold on the current system of partisan activists - is for the vast and unengaged middle to re-enter the game and wrest control from the ideologues. Simply chosing between the tweedle-dee Democrats and the tweedle-dum Republicans will not suffice. Rather the current party system must be brought down.

New Census Data Should be a Wake-up Call to Maryland GOP

Want to better understand Martin O'Malley's 14 point victory margin over Republican and former Governor Bob Ehrlich in Maryland? Look no farther than the just release Census data for Maryland - all of Maryland's population growth over the past decade has been among racial and ethnic minorities. In 2000, non-Hispanic whites were 65% of the state's population. In 2010, that has fallen to below 55%. All told, that state has welcomed 477,000 new residents, a 9% increase in the past decade. But the population of non-Hispanic whites has declined by 3.9% while the Hispanic population more than doubled, the Asian population increased by 51% and the African American population by 14%.
These numbers should serve as wake-up call for the Maryland Republican Party. Table One shows what the new numbers are likely to mean for the composition of Maryland voters based on national voter registration and turnout rates.

In November 2010, Bob Ehrlich, a former governor elected by a 3 point margin in 2002, defeated by 6 points in 2006, was trounced by a 14 point margin. Ehrlich's 14 point margin of loss was first forecast in a Washington Post poll released days before the election. In that poll, the Post found that O'Malley was leading among African American voters by a margin of 88% to 6%, Ehrlich led among whites 50% to 44% (When Ehrlich won the governorship in 2002 he received 64% of the white vote). I could not find any Maryland polls from 2006 of 2010 that reported support among Hispanic or Asian voters, but this is not surprising as each population composed less than 5% of the state's population. A review of national exit polls from 2010 shows that Democrats won Hispanic voters by a 60% to 38% margin and Asian voters by a similar 58% to 40%. Democratic and Republican support among African Americans was 89% and 9% respectively - essentially the same as in Maryland. Nationwide, Republicans fared better among white voters, 60% to 37%, than did Ehrlich in Maryland.

If I take the nationwide numbers and apply them to voter numbers in Table One the result is a 56% to 44% Republican loss (Table Two) - not far from the 55.8% to 42.3% actual results (note that my population tallies do exclude a a few thousand state residents of mixed, or Native American heritage - exit polls often categorize these populations collectively as "other" and show that Democrats win them by a margin similar to that of Hispanic and Asian voters).

The new Census data is an alarm bell for Maryland Republicans and it's warning them that unless they can broaden their appeal beyond the state's shrinking share of white voters they will not be winning statewide office. But let's assume that Republicans in Maryland can regularly receive 60% - or even Ehrlich's 2002 level of 64% support among white voters - I show that in Table Three - the Republican still loses by 10 points.

Republicans cannot base a statewide electoral strategy on winning the white vote and losing all other racial and ethnic groups by wide margins. Table Four offers just one simulation of how Republicans would  have to perform among the non-white population just to receive 50% of the vote in Maryland.

Notice that it is a substantial change - a dramatic improvement among African Americans and considerable improvement among Hispanics. Critics of my quick analysis may well point out that turn-out among African American voters in Maryland is often lower than nationwide turn-out so I may be overstating Democratic performance a bit, but I would counter by pointing out that a strategy based on the hope that key voting groups stay home is no strategy - it's a gamble. I would add as well that Hispanic and Asian voters still have very low turn-out rates, but these rates have been rising and if turn-out among Hispanics eventually rises to that of African-American and white voters then Republicans will have no hope of winning statewide without becoming more competitive among non-whites.

The demographic changes taking place in Maryland are but a leading indicator of changes taking place throughout the United States. If Maryland Republicans can find a way to broaden their appeal and again become competitive in the Free State, they may well serve as an example for national Republicans to emulate. Republicans reclaimed the House of Representatives in November in victory fueled by support among white voters and lower turn-out by minority voters. In 2008, Barack Obama won election even though he lost white voters by a 12 point margin - his victory was driven by wide victories among racial and ethnic minorities - winning Hispanic and Asian voters by a nearly 2 to 1 margin. Just 4 years early, George W. Bush was much more competitive among these voters - but between 2004 and 2008 the GOP adopted a hard line on immigration reform and minority voters turned away from the party.

In Maryland, the GOP could begin by supporting measures such as the Maryland DREAM Act which would extend in-state college tuition benefits to undocumented immigrants who have attended state high schools. One may wonder what impact that would have on the votes of legal immigrants but consider just one example recently profiled in the Washington Post - Anngie Gutierrez is a High School senior at Bladensburg High, she is an undocumented resident and ineligible for in-state tuition (nor can she register to vote). When asked about the bill, Republican House Minority Leader Anthony O'Donnell said "Why would we offer in-state tuition to people who violated our laws to get here?"


Anngie, like most undocumented youths, was brought to the US illegally when she was a child. Her parents may have violated the law, but she did not. More significant with regard to political fallout, however, Anngie has three siblings who were born in the US. They are citizens and they will be able to vote when they're 18. Can anyone reasonably assume that they would consider voting for a party that sought to block their sister's access to an affordable education? Doubtful.

When asked about the doubling of the state's Hispanic population Republican Delegate Patrick McDonough reportedly replied  "This should be a warning bell to the state of Maryland that we have a serious illegal immigration problem." The fact that McDonough see Hispanic as synonymous with illegal immigrant is not a good sign that Republicans have a strategy to deal with the electoral significance of the state's changing demographics.

For Maryland Republicans, the phone is ringing - will they take the call?