Polarization in America Is Not Ideological

Across two books and multiple blog posts I have argued that Americans ARE NOT ideologically polarized nor are they more partisan. Rather we're less attached to party and most Americans lack a cohesive ideology. Ideological polarization and entrenched partisanship are instead reserved for political elites.
A new study by Eric Groenendyke makes the case far more eloquently: In short, he finds no evidence to support claims of mass polarization along ideological lines. In fact, their is widespread policy agreement among Americans on all be a few issues. Additionally, there is no evidence of Americans becoming more attached to their parties. Instead, he finds few people love, or even like, their own party or think it represents their interests well. Nevertheless, voters increasingly hate the other party, and this is enough to keep them in their respective parties. The more frustrated folks become with their own party, the more they denounce and demonize the other party. Demonizing the other party makes voters feel better about sticking with a party that doesn't do a good job representing them. And the more a party acts out of fear and loathing toward the other party there is less cooperation and compromise and more reasons for voters to dislike their party and more reasons for the other party to demonize their party.
Think of it this way, many folks who voted for Trump didn't care what policies he proposed or his character flaws. They cared that he wasn't a Democrat. Much as many voted against him not because of who he was or love of Clinton but because he was a Republican. That means as well that should he run for re-election, many voters will be motivated to vote AGAINST the Democrat with little care for what Trump has done or not done.
This type of polarization and partisanship is especially unhealthy. Because folks are voting against the other party instead of for their own party the winning party receives no mandate to govern. Rather once the "other" party loses voters tend to focus on the reasons why they dislike their own party. If Groenendyke is correct then the more dissatisfied voters become with their own party the more they will look to demonize the other party.
This suggests that Trump's frequent tirades against Republicans and well as Democrats may be a very effective way to keep his base.

The Unholy Trinity: Redistricting, Closed Primaries, and the Money Chase

America's Dysfuntional Politics
In a report released last Winter, National Journal determined "the overall level of congressional polarization last year (2010) was the highest... recorded... every Senate Democrat compiled a voting record more liberal than every Senate Republican—and every Senate Republican compiled a voting record more conservative than every Senate Democrat." In the House "five House Republicans in 2010 generated vote ratings more liberal than the most conservative House Democrat" and "four Democrats produced ratings more conservative than the most liberal Republican... Every other House Republican produced a more conservative vote rating than every other House Democrat... Of the nine members who were outliers last year, only one... is still in Congress."

How have times changed? "In 1982... fully 344 House members received... vote ratings between the most liberal Republican and the most conservative Democrat." As for the Senate, " In... 1982... 36 Senate Democrats compiled records at least as conservative as the most liberal Republican... 24 Senate Republicans compiled voting records at least as liberal as the most conservative Democrat."

Put simply - Congress has no political center. This absence of a center makes compromise a near impossibility. That would not be a problem if one party clearly dominated in an era of unified government, but the present era is marked by a high level of party competition, tenuous holds on power, and divided government. The result? Gridlock.

Noted Congressional scholar Norm Ornstein summarized it like this "close partisan margins, which gave rise to high-stakes legislative politics and sharply reduced incentives for lawmakers to work across party lines to solve problems."

So what has caused the polarization? This is actually a point of much contention. Scholars like Alan Abramowitz argue the polarization in Congress is reflective of an increasingly polarized public. Others, like Morris Fiorina contend the polarization is elite-driven. As argued in prior posts, I clearly agree with the Fiorina camp.

So if not reflective of a polarized public, what is driving the polarization. There is likely no one explanation, but rather a combination of factors. I put my money of the unholy trinity of partisan redistricting, closed nominating primaries, and the cost of campaigns.

Partisan Redistricting
Gerrymandering is not new (the terms dates to the early 1800s), but technological advances and high levels of political competition have elevated it to new levels. Some scholars argue gerrymandering cannot explain the polarization in House, because the Senate is polarized as well and polarization is evident in state legislatures and county councils. These scholars often fail to consider the prior elective experience of U.S. Senators. In the current Congress (and it's not an outlier) roughly two-thirds of the Senate held prior elective office in a seat subject to partisan redistricting - ranging from a U.S. House seat to a state legislative seat. And state legislative districts are often more gerrymandered than Congressional districts - one need look no farther than Maryland's state legislative districts.

In a study by Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal the authors concede that it is nearly impossible for a moderate to win in the nation's currently manipulated Congressional districts, but they see little evidence to support gerrymandering as the cause.  They contend it's difficult to gerrymander many states due to size and population and many have few districts, but this also ignores the impact of gerrymandered state legislative districts and the prior elective experience of U.S. House members. McCarty et al. determined as well that within the same district Democratic and Republican representatives compile distinctly divergent records. This of course can only be studied in districts that are competitive and where candidates from either party can win. Most districts in the U.S. are safe and the out-party has no hope of winning.

The authors note "Republicans are more likely to represent conservative districts, and Democrats are more likely to represent liberal ones" and concede "such an effect is consistent with the gerrymandering hypothesis,
but it is also consistent with a general geographic polarization of voters along ideological and partisan lines." Finally, they determined ideological sorting of candidates began in the 1980s, but this was before the upswing of polarization and before the decline in electoral competition in the House. There are problems with these conclusions as well.

As will be discussed later, the rise in the use of primary elections to select nominees began in the early 1970s and had become the norm by the 1980s. Most primary elections are cosed - meaning only Democrats can vote in Democratic primaries and only Republicans in a Republican primary. I dispute as well the contention that 1980s were not an era of increased competition in the House. In the election of 1980, Republicans won 34 seats and completely recovered from the electoral devastation of Watergate. At 192 seats, the GOP saw a path back to a majority. With a high number of conservative southern Democrats at times the GOP seemed to have a working control of the agenda in the early years of the Reagan presidency. Republicans suffered a setback in 1982, but the era of Democratic dominance was clearly over.

Closed Primaries
Following a series of party reforms in the late 1960s primary elections became the typical approach to selecting candidates for general election contests by the end of the 1970s. In an open primary voters are allowed to vote outside of their declared political party. This allows independents and moderates to have more of a say in government and in their elected officials. However, most states have closed primaries, where only partisans can participate. The result being a system where very few people determine the candidates on the general election ballot and those candidates reflect the preference of dedicated partisan - this means liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans. As such, even in a competitive district the eventual winner is likely to be a liberal Democrat or a conservative Republican (explaining one the findings by McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal).

Karen Kaufmann, James Gimpel, and Adam Hoffman studied the issue of open primaries and determined they attract more demographically representative voters; attract more centrist voters; and produce more moderate nominees than closed primaries.

As noted earlier, most Congressional districts are not competitive - somewhere in the neighborhood of 360 seats. In these seats, a Representative faces little threat from the opposing party in a general election. The greater threat comes from within the party in a primary election. This means Representatives must work to ensure support among their party's base voters (again liberal Democrats or conservative Republicans). As the chart below Demonstrates, partisan loyalty increases and increased significantly the safer the Congressional district. If primaries were open to all voters, regardless of party, the pressure would be quite different. Even if the Congressional districts were safe, base voters would not be selecting the candidates and the candidates would need to appeal to a broader swath of the electorate to secure a nomination. Of course the power of incumbency and safe seats make it quite difficult to challenge a sitting Representative - challenging and expensive.

Relationship between Partisan Loyalty and District Safety
(Source: National Journal - Pulling Apart)

The Money Game
According to OpenSecrets.org, the average House incumbent raised $1.5 million for their reelection campaign in 2010. The average challenger raised $265,000. The tremendous expense of House elections puts pressure on incumbents to raise money - just over $2,000 each day they are in office. Those voters with deeply held beliefs are the ones most likely to donate money. As demonstrated in a prior post, few folks make political contribution and those that do are far more ideologically polarized than those who do not.

Joseph Bafumi and Michael Herron have shown that members of Congress are not only more partisan than the median voter in their respective states, they are more partisan than their fellow partisan voters. Democrats in Congress are to the left of the median Democratic voter and Republicans to the right of the median Republican voter. The exception being campaign donors - elected officials are quite ideologically aligned with the folks who write the checks.

In “The Price of Leadership: Campaign Money and the Polarization of Congressional Parties,” Eric Heberlig, Marc Hetherington, and Bruce Larson determine the parties are driven by the need for money and support is given to candidates or incumbents who can raise it. The authors conclude, "a plausible new route into party leadership is by demonstrating fundraising capacity for the benefit of the party” and this has “changed the ideological composition of leadership." Once, parties sought to nominate candidates capable of building a coalition or managing legislation, but today fundraising has become the critical deciding factor.

The Unholy Trinity
Taken collectively, the unholy trinity of partisan redistricting, closed primaries, and the money chase offer a plausible explanation for our present levels polarization and dysfunction. Reforms aimed at fixing any one of the three would likely have little effect - rather all must be addressed. Legislation is pending in Congress that would require all states to adopt non-partisan redistricting reform, but such legislation has been introduced before and has been ignored. Seven states have adopted non-partisan, or bipartisan redistricting reforms - but these states hold only 88 of 435 seats. In most states, the parties are simply unwilling to surrender the power to gerrymander.

Roughly 28 states have closed or semi-closed primaries or closed caucuses. The structure and rules for primary elections are left up to the states and are often determined by the parties as independent entities. In states where citizens have pushed for open primaries, the parties have fought to maintain control over the candidate nomination process.

Public financing of presidential elections has been in place since the 1970s, but no such system exists for Congress. Though the Supreme Court has ruled you cannot place limits on private campaign spending, it is lawful to put limits on spending if an individual accepts public funding. Proposals for public funding of Congressional elections have been introduced in nearly every Congress since the early 1970s - but to no avail. Public financing would immediately remove a tremendous advantage enjoyed by incumbents and they do not appear eager to let that advantage go. Kenneth R. Mayer, Timothy Werner, and Amanda Williams studied state legislative elections in five states that offer public financing and determined competition generally increased after public financing was enacted, both in terms of the number of incumbents facing challengers, and the number of “competitive” races.

Competitive races, open primaries, and competition for the median voter instead of the partisan campaign donor. Congressional districts where voters pick their representative instead of incumbent representatives picking their voters.  Collectively these changes offer the hope of decreased polarization in Congress and the return to a functioning government. But the folks who would need to change the rules of the game are the same folks who know how to play the game as it is currently structured.  There is little indication that they are willing to rewrite those rules and invite a new group of players. So for now, let the dysfunction resume.

Shelby Perkins, a Political Science and Spanish major at St. Mary's College of Maryland contributed significantly to this post.

America is not Polarized, but the Parties Are, part 15...

Now that the battle over the Debt Ceiling is settled (at least until Congress comes back from recess) we are once again treated to the usual chorus of voices bemoaning how polarized America has become. As such, I feel compelled to once again dispell the myth that America is a polarized nation.

As I argued during the healthcare battle, after the Gabbie Giffords shooting, and prior to the 2010 midterms, Americans are not polarized (at least no more polarized than at any point in the last 40 years), but our two political parties are very polarized - dominated by ideological and issue activists who do not represent the beliefs of the larger electorate.

Since the 1960s and the end of the Democratic Party’s dominance of the New Deal Era, American politics has become far more competitive. Democrats lost their solid hold on the South and Republicans lost their hold on the North East. Only 7 states had divided government in 1954, in 2007 that number stood at 23 states. With few exceptions, either party has fair shot at winning statewide elections in most states. Control of Congress and the White House has bounced back and forth between the two parties. The parties have responded to this era of competition by becoming ever more partisan and polarized.

A recent study by political scientist Daniel Coffey determined that there is a direct and positive correlation between party competition and party ideology. As a state becomes more competitive between Republicans and Democrats the respective parties become ever more conservative and liberal. V.O. Key hinted at this in 1956 when he argued that competition would force parties to offer more distinct policies to voters in an effort to influence their choice. Additionally, as competition increases the parties come to rely more heavily, not on the mean, median, or moderate voter, but rather on the more committed and activist voter. This means liberal activists for Democrats and conservative activists for Republicans. This has the effect of pushing the parties ever farther to the extreme.

As the agendas of the two political parties became ever more divergent after the 1960s Americans began to "sort" more neatly into one party or the other, a phenomenon known as party sorting. As the Democratic Party became more liberal and the Republican Party more conservative, liberal Republicans left the party and became Democrats or Independents and conservative Democrats became Republicans or Independents. The parties polarized, the public did not.

In fact, there has been precious little change in the last 30 years with regard to the share of Americans who identify as Conservative, Moderate, or Liberal. Rather conservatives no longer feel comfortable in the Democratic Party and Liberals are no longer comfortable in the Republican Party - Moderates appear to be less comfortable with both parties and that explains why Independent voters have emerged as the fastest growing segment of the American electorate. As a result of this sorting, the Republican Party became more homogenously Conservative and the Democratic Party more homogenously Liberal. So the distribution of Liberals, Conservatives, and Moderates within the the two parties has changed significantly while the distribution of Liberals, Conservatives, and Moderates within  broader electorate has changed very little.

The electorate is no more polarized now than in 1970, 1980, or 1990 - but the parties are. So of course 90 percent of Republicans vote Republican and 90 percent of Democrats vote Democrat and Presidential approval correlates to party affiliation, and Democratic members of Congress have become more Liberal and Republican members of Congress more conservative. Meanwhile, Moderate voters tend to split their support between the parties, but also vote at lower levels - likely a result of feeling ill-represented by either party. All of this is a natural byproduct of party sorting, but party sorting is not the same as polarization.

Though some scholars (especially, but not limited to, Alan Abramowitz) have advanced the theory that this growing polarization among elected officials is in fact reflective of a polarized public, there is in fact little evidence that the mass public has become polarized. Rather the polarization has occurred among committed political activists and the interest groups they support – a relatively small share of the electorate.

This is evident in Figure One, panel A shows the self-identified ideological orientation of the general electorate at three points 1972, 1994, and 2008. Although the distribution has shifted over time, the distribution remains normal with most voters amassed in the center as Moderates. Panel B is limited to those members of the electorate who indicated that they had worked for a campaign and given money to a candidate – I define these voters as party activists. Among these activists, a clear bimodal distribution is evident with the peaks of the distribution to the left and the right of moderation.

According to political scientist Anthony Downs in a winner-take-all election system coupled with two dominant parties (as in the United States) the parties will adopt positions that are ideologically attractive to the greatest concentration of voters.

The distribution of the American electorate (in the broadest sense) is unimodal which, according to Downs, should promote more moderate parties as they compete for the median voter. But Downs’ theory further suggests that if the electorate was polarized into two distinct voting blocs, one left of center and one right of center, the parties would “diverge toward the extremes rather than converge on the center. Each gains more votes by moving toward a radical position than it loses in the center (p. 143).” Steven Hill writes "one of the defining characteristics of a winner-take-all system is that it promotes adversarial politics so that on a whole host of issues it is painfully obvious that the overriding agenda for both major parties is... to stake out positions vis-a-vis the other side."

In the 1960s Republicans exploited several emerging schisms in the ranks of the Democratic Party's coalition in order to become competitive - schisms revolving around national security, welfare spending, and policies with regard to race relations. The party defined itself by being what the Democratic Party was not. Over time both parties increasingly defined themselves by being the antithesis of the other party - this is why there can be no middle ground on isues ranging from abortion, entitlement spending, taxes, environmental regulation, healthcare reform - each party's identity is inextricably linked to being the mirror image of the other party.

This led to party sorting, internal partisan homogeneity, and the bimodal distribution of the engaged voters evident in Figure One. The distribution of the most engaged and activist elements of the electorate, those most likely to participate and vote in elections, is bimodal which has resulted in two polarized parties and the system now feeds off of that bimodal distribution. So long as the more Moderate members of the general electorate remain less engaged there is little incentive for either party to moderate and pursue Moderate voters; rather to do so would risk alienating more committed activist party members. So long as neither party moderates and pursues more Moderate members of the electorate there is little incentive for Moderate voters to become more engaged – a self-reinforcing cycle exists.

The increased electoral competition between the Democratic and Republican parties, in the current era, has had a significant impact on public opinion, partisanship, polarization, and the institutions of governance. As described by Congressional scholar Norm Orstein the present era is “an extended era of close partisan margins, which gave rise to high-stakes legislative politics and sharply reduced incentives for lawmakers to work across party lines to solve problems.”

The only hope for restoring moderation, compromise, and good government - for breaking the hold on the current system of partisan activists - is for the vast and unengaged middle to re-enter the game and wrest control from the ideologues. Simply chosing between the tweedle-dee Democrats and the tweedle-dum Republicans will not suffice. Rather the current party system must be brought down.

America Needs a Declaration of Independents...

There is so much to love in Jeffrey Sachs all out attack on the colossal failings of America's two major political parties.

Every part of the budget debate in the U.S. is built on a tissue of willful deceit. Consider the Republican Party's double-mantra that the deficit results from "runaway spending" and that more tax cuts are the key to economic growth. Republicans claim that the budget deficit, around 10 percent of GDP, has been caused only by a rise in outlays. This is blatantly untrue. The deficit results roughly equally from a fall of tax revenues as a share of GDP and a rise of spending as a share of GDP... The Democrats of the White House and much of Congress have been less crude, but no less insidious, in their duplicity... at every crucial opportunity, Obama has failed to stand up for the poor and middle class. He refused to tax the banks and hedge funds properly on their outlandish profits; he refused to limit in a serious way the bankers' mega-bonuses even when the bonuses were financed by taxpayer bailouts; and he even refused to stand up against extending the Bush tax cuts for the rich last December, though 60 percent of the electorate repeatedly and consistently demanded that the Bush tax cuts at the top should be ended. It's not hard to understand why. Obama and Democratic Party politicians rely on Wall Street and the super-rich for campaign contributions the same way that the Republicans rely on oil and coal. In America today, only the rich have political power.

Sachs concludes "America needs a third-party movement to break the hammerlock of the financial elites. Until that happens, the political class and the media conglomerates will continue to spew lies, American militarism will continue to destabilize a growing swath of the world, and the country will continue its economic decline."

I do not disagree with Sachs' assessment. I for one am tired of hearing partisans defend their party while proclaiming that "the other side" is the unreasonable party. A review of recent columns by leading opinion leaders on the Left and the Right reveals little more than an exercise in finger pointing and self righteous indignation. From the Left you'll hear that the Republicans are "hostage takers" willing to risk fiscal ruin to protect America's wealthy. On the Right you'll hear that President Obama and Congressional Democrats refuse to accept significant spending cuts because to do so would be to admit that the modern progressive era is over, and failed.

The truth is America is being ill-served by both parties as they seek to appeal to ever more partisan and polarized bases.

Some, argue that the American electorate is polarized as the two parties simply reflect that polarization. But there is little to no evidence that the general public is polarized - at least any more polarized now than at any point in the last 30 years. Rather we live in a two party system and the parties have become ever more polarized and controlled by partisan fringes. Polarized parties create the illusion of a polarized public. Problem is, a winner-take-all, plurality rule, two-party system is supposed to promote the creation of two moderate parties.


In his seminal work, Economic Theory of Democracy, Anthony Downs wrote when the electorate is polarized "regardless of which party is in office, half the electorate always feels that the other half is imposing policies upon it that are strongly repugnant to it... In this situation, if one party keeps getting reelected, the disgruntled supporters of the other party will probably revolt; whereas if he two parties alternate in office, social chaos occurs, because government policy keeps changing from one extreme to the other."

One could look to that passage as prophetic, but what if Downs had it backward? What if polarized parties led to the polarized electorate? Extensive research by Fiorina shows us that the mass public has not become more polarized even as the members of the two parties have - especially the most engaged members.

A recent study by Daniel Coffey (in PS: Political Science and Politics) determined that there is a direct and positive correlation between party competition and party ideology. As a state becomes more competitive between Republicans and Democrats the respective parties become ever more conservative and liberal.

So as politics became more competitive through the 1960s, 70s, 80s, and 90s the parties responded by becoming ever more ideological. V. O. Key argued that competition would force parties to offer more distinct policies to voters in an effort to influence their choice.

As competition increased the parties came to rely more heavily not on the median voter in a unimodal distribution, but rather on the more committed and active voters on the left and right of the distribution.

As the agendas of the political parties became ever more divergent Americans began to "sort" more neatly into one party or the other - and more Americans began to identify as either pure Independents or only loosely associated with a party. As the agenda of the Democratic Party became more liberal and the Republican Party more conservative, liberal Republicans left the party and became Democrats or Independents and conservative Democrats became Republicans or Independents.

The parties polarized, the public did not. There has been precious little change in the last 30 years with regard to the share of Americans who identify as Conservative, Moderate, or Liberal. Rather conservatives no longer feel comfortable in the Democratic Party and Liberals are no longer comfortable in the Republican Party - Moderates appear to be less comfortable with both parties.

The electorate is no more polarized now than in 1970, 1980, or 1990 - but the parties are. So of course 90% of Republicans vote Republican and 90% of Democrats vote Democrat. Of course Presidential approval correlates to party affiliation, it's the natural byproduct of party sorting, but party sorting is not the same as polarization. Moderate voters tend to split their support and vote at lower levels.

So what we have is a modification to Downs. The distribution of the American electorate (in the broadest sense) is unimodal which should promote more moderate parties, but the distribution of the most engaged and activist elements of the electorate is bimodal which has resulted in two polarized parties.

Steven Hill (author of Fixing Elections: The Failure of Winner Take All Elections) writes "one of the defining characteristics of a winner-take-all system is that it promotes adversarial politics so that on a whole host of issues it is painfully obvious that the overriding agenda for both major parties is... to stake out positions vis-a-vis the other side."

In the 1960s Republicans exploited several emerging schisms in the ranks of the Democratic Party's coalition in order to become competitive - schisms revolving around national security, welfare spending, and policies with regard to race relations. The party defined itself by being what the Democratic Party was not. Over time the parties increasingly defined themselves by being the antithesis of the other party.

This led to party sorting, internal partisan homogeneity, and the bimodal distribution of the engaged voters and the system now feeds off of that bimodal distribution even as the broader mass electorate's distribution remains unimodal.

And such a system can be maintained so long as the respective bases maintain intensity and the strategies used to motivate base voters do not alienate more moderate voters who are often needed to swing an election given the near parity of each party's base.

But what happens when the strategies, rhetoric, and policies required to maintain base allegiance begin to alienate more moderate voters? If those voters simply stop voting it may not matter, but if they continue to vote it could be very disruptive as they seek an electoral outlet.

It would be reasonable for one party to moderate and absorb those moderate voters, but doing so risks losing their base. So instead both parties engage in what Jacobs and Shapiro (Politicians Dont' Pander) describe as "crafted talk" in which they use words that suggest moderation even as they pursue very partisan policies. But the pursuit of those policies will push the moderate voters away - and they only have one other choice, the opposition party.
It's possible, that as the base strategy accelerates one would expect to see more see-saw elections like 2006 and 2010. Such oscillations in partisan control of government contributes to the present era's dysfunction, but so long as the parties remain committed to a polarized, partisan base strategy it will remain a feature of the present era.

And that brings us back to Sachs. America does not need a third party; rather America needs two new parties. In recent years we have seen an increase in the number of voter instigated ballot initiatives, rising levels of voter discontent, see-saw election results like the 2006 and 2010 midterms.

The evidence suggest that the broader electorate is beginning to resist and push back against the current political system. Perhaps disaffected voters in the broader electorate are nearing a critical mass and may soon be able to break the hold on the system by the two parties.

Only time will tell, but the current political system which emerged from the turmoil and tumult of the 1960s, has not lasted longer than any recognized political era in American history. Of course, our two major parties control campaign fundraising laws, ballot access, voter registration laws, the drawing of Congressional districts, the manner in which electoral votes are awarded, and access to the public airways. It's a duopoly more damaging than any monopoly in American history.

The only way to break their hold is to mobilize the growing number of folks who feel alienated from both parties, the 40% of folks who don't vote and in presidential elections, and the 60% who don't vote in Congressional elections. It's time for a revolution... not like 1776, but rather the electoral revolutions of 1800, or 1828, or 1860, or 1932.... we need systemic transformation from below and we need it soon.

America needs a Declaration of Independents... a declaration that we will no longer allow America's future and prosperity to be held hostage to the narrow ideological pursuits of the Democratic and Republican parties and the ideologues who fund them.

Independent Voters are no Myth

Over at Larry Sabato's Crystal Ball page, senior columnist Alan Abramowitz takes on what he calls "myths" about Independent voters. Several of his points are quite correct and I will not quibble with them, but Abramowitz is far too dismissive of what it means to be an Independent. Abramowitz writes "the large majority of independents are independents in name only. Research by political scientists on the American electorate has consistently found that the large majority of self-identified independents are “closet partisans” who think and vote much like other partisans."

What do the numbers tell us about Independents? Though some scholars (Abramowitz among them) contend that there has been a marked rise in partisanship among the mass electorate in recent years and a solidification of partisan support, there is equally compelling evidence that the trek away from party allegiance that began in the 1960s continues through today.

According to data from the American National Election Study, in 1964 approximately 76 percent of the country identified as a “Partisan” (either weak or strong) in contrast only 24 percent identified as Independent or Leaning Independent (Leaners). By 1984 it was 65 percent to 35 percent and in 2008 it was 60 percent to 40 percent. Across that 42 year span the share identifying as Strong Partisans decreased from 38 percent in 1964 to 32 percent in 2008 and Weak Partisans declined from 38 percent to 28 percent. The share identifying as Leaning Independent, so-called Leaners, doubled from 15 percent to 29 percent. Though research has shown that many self identified Independents will express a partisan preference if pressed, there has been a clear trend toward an initial preference of Independent.

Through 1964 fewer than a quarter of the electorate self identified as a Pure Independent or an Independent leaning Democrats or Republicans. By 1968 that share had risen to 30 percent, and as of 2008 was at 39 percent of the electorate. There is no indication of decline in the Independent preference among voters. Though they may lean Democrat or Republican Americans are clearly less willing to express allegiance to one of the two major parties than they were in the 1950s and 1960s.

Some scholars use the same data to make the opposite argument concluding “if voters are becoming more partisan, we would expect declines in pure independents to result in increases in independent partisans. This is evident for both Democrats and Republicans.” That conclusion is debatable. If indeed we are seeing an increase in partisanship then perhaps we would see a decline in pure independents, but it is also likely that we would see a rise in partisans of all stripes – Strong, Weak and Independent. For Democrats, this has not happened and the rise in Independent Democrats appears not to have come from declines in pure Independents, but rather a decline in Weak Democrats – this does not suggest growing partisanship, but rather weakening partisanship.

The chart above tracks Democratic Party identification since 1952 and shows a clear decline in Democratic Party affiliation. From 1952 through 1968 Democratic Party affiliation averaged 54.9 percent of the electorate, from 1970 through 1980 the average was 52.3 percent and since 1982 the average is 49.8 percent. If one were to narrow the window to the 1990-2008 period the average is 49.7 percent. Though the share of Strong Democrats has rebounded from its lows in the 1970s it remains well below its average from 1952 through 1968. There also has been a marked decline in the share of Weak Democrats since the 1960s and it appears that the increase in Independent Democrats has been driven by the decline in Weak Democrats – not by a decline in Pure Independents. In short, fewer people are identifying as Democrats than did so prior to 1968 and those who do identify as Democrats are increasingly identifying as Independent Democrats.

The ANES data does show an increase in Republican partisanship, but this in entirely consistent with the collapse of the New Deal era and with it the dominance of the Democratic Party.  Even among Republicans, however, there has been considerable growth among Independent partisans and evidence of a rebound among Strong Republicans following the lows of the 1970s – likely an artifact of the Nixon Administration and Watergate. The Republican share of the electorate averaged 33.9 percent from 1952 through 1968, then fell to 32.1 percent during the 1970s, and climbed to 38.2 percent in the decades since 1980. But the share of Strong Republicans from 1982 through 2008 was 12.2 percent, essentially the same as the average of 12.4 percent prior to 1968 – the “rise” in Strong Republicans is again likely an artifact of a collapse in Republican Party identification during the 1970s.

That said, the true growth area in partisan politics has been among the group of Americans Identifying as Independent, either Pure, or Leaning Democrat or Republican. Though there are fewer Pure Independents as a share of the electorate than during the decade immediately following the collapse of the New Deal Era in the late 1960s and during the height of the Watergate era there are more Pure Independents, Independent Democrats, and Independent Republicans today than during any measured era dating to the 1950s.

So when Gallup release a graph, like the one below, Democrats and Republicans should be concerned. Though Democratic Party affiliation matched a 20 year peak of 36 percent in 2008 it has since fallen to its lowest levels (according to Gallup) in 22 years. The Gallup data clearly shows that neither party can claim the allegiance of a majority of the electorate and since 1990 has rarely captured a plurality. At best, the data on party affiliation, whether from ANES or Gallup, suggest that there has been some solidification of the Strong Partisan base of each party, though collectively these Strong Partisans account for less than one-third of the electorate.

Are Independents independent in name only? No, not really. In The Myth of the Independent Voter, Keith et al., (1992) argued there has been little change in partisan attachment since the 1960s. Rather, the authors contend people identifying as Independents often reveal a preference for one of the two major parties when pressed to make a choice. These Leaners behave much the same as their more partisan counterparts with regard to issue positions and vote choice - this is the Abramowitx argument. In a 2009 article in Electoral Studies, political scientist John Petrocick argued, “Leaners are partisans. Characterizing them as independents underestimates the partisanship of Americans…”

But studies of partisanship often consider the views of Leaners at a given point in time or their votes in a specific election or examine the stability of partisan identification by merging all partisans – Strong, Weak, or Leaning – together and measure macro-level party identification. These measure do not take into consideration the temporal nature of partisan attachment and the propensity to change party affiliation over time. Additionally, in an era of candidate-centered politics it is possible that Idependents express a preference for the party of the candidate that they have chosen to support. So it would not be surprising that an Independent that leans Democratic votes the same as a Strong Partisan Democrat - in a specific election. But the Strong Partisan Democrat voted Democratic because of partisanship, the Independent, however, voted Democrat and expressed a Democratic preference because of the candidate.

But the lerger question really pertains to the size and stability of a governing coalition over time. For a President or a political party to succeed they must have a stable electoral coalition. If Independent voters are the fastest growing segment of the electorate and if they are truly independent, then Democrats and Republicans need to worry. But if folks like Alan Abramowitz are correct, then the parties can ignore the threat of the Independent voter.

A review of ANES data from a panel survey that included 2000, 2002, and 2004 however, shows that Independent Democrats and Independent Republicans (roughly a third of each party) are much less attached to their party than either Weak or Strong partisans over time.

Of those respondents who self-identified as an Independent Democrat in 2000, 31.4 percent no longer identified with the Democratic Party in 2002, nearly as many, 29.8 percent, no longer identified with the party in 2004. For Republican Leaners the results were similar, 27.2 percent no longer identified with the Republican Party in 2002, 26.1 percent in 2004.

Strong as well as Weak partisans left their respective parties at far smaller rates over time. Equally worthy of not, Independent Democrats and Republicans who left their 2000 party were just as likely to identify with the opposition party in 2002 and 2004 as they were to simply identify as pure Independents.

A review of 2004 partisan identification shows that fully one-third of Independent Democrats and Independent Republicans in 2004 identified with another party or no party in 2000. Simply stated, partisan identification is much less stable among Independent partisans and Eric McGhee and Daniel Krimm (in a 2009 issue of Polity) found that Independent partisans are more moderate than Strong partisans.

Abramowitz and others are correct - Independent Partisans do vote much like their Strong Partisan counterparts in a given election, but the ANES panel data suggests that a significant share of Independent Partisans (between a quarter and a third) may well have a different partisan stripe by the next election cycle. Far from the “unmoved mover” described in The American Voter (Campbell et al., 1960), partisanship among Independent Partisans moves and they are the fasted growing segment of the electorate.

Fully 11% of the electorate are Pure Independents, another 30% are Independent Partisans (about 18% Democrats and 12% Republicans) and between one-quarter and one-third of these Independent Partisans are far less attached to party from election to election. At the very least, this suggests a 20% voting bloc that is quite volatile - in a country where our presidential elections have been decided by margins of 7 percentage points or less since 2000 and the difference between the national two party vote share in House elections has averaged about 5 percentage points since 1990.

Independent voters are no myth, they matter, and (when you include among them Independent Partisans) they absolutely sway elections. Indeed, the present and highly competitive political era in which we are living is a direct result of a decrease in partisan attachment coupled with an increasing level of partisanship among each party's relatively equal (and small) in size base.